

6 10 July 1747  
LIBERTY and RIGHT:

OR, AN

ESSAY,

HISTORICAL and POLITICAL,

ON THE

CONSTITUTION and ADMINISTRATION

OF

GREAT-BRITAIN. K

Humbly offered to the Consideration of all Men;  
but more especially to the Consideration of the  
ELECTORS and FREEHOLDERS of Great-  
Britain, and their REPRESENTATIVES in  
Parliament.

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*Ut enim tutela, sic procuratio reipublicæ, ad utilitatem  
eorum qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum quibus com-  
missa est, gerenda est.*

CIC.

*Qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem negligunt,  
rem perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt, seditionem  
atque discordiam; ex quo evenit, ut alii Populares,  
alii studiosi optimi cujusque, videantur, Pauci Uni-  
versorum.*

IDEM.

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PART II.


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## INTRODUCTION.



AD every Prince and Minister of Power been as anxious to promote the Liberty and Happiness of the People, as the individual Enemies of every Government have been eager and industrious to create and foment the Spirit of Party and Sedition, happy had it been for the World, but particularly happy for *Britain*. Had our Kings and their Ministers steadily eyed and forwarded the End and Intention of their Institution, and recommended their Government to the Favour and Esteem of the People, by advancing and enlarging native Freedom and national Happiness; or had our publick and private Writers been ever animated with that Spirit of Patriotism and Liberty generally laid Claim to, not been inflam'd with the Rage of Party and private Disappointment,

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ment, not play'd fast and loose, now adapting themselves to one Faction, and now to another, as either happen'd to prevail; there wou'd have been at this Day but one Interest and one Object of Loyalty in view, and the whole *British* People would have been equally careful and equally resolute to support and advance the Liberty and Independency of *Britain*, and to preserve and protect the Rights and Privileges of *British* Royalty. But to us the Reverse hath happen'd. We have seen how the Nation hath been cajol'd and deceiv'd; how the People have trusted, and been betray'd by their own Credulity and Confidence. We have seen how Kings and Ministers have attempted, by open Force and private Fraud, to weaken and reduce any Appearance of a proper Constitution. We have seen how one Constitution was subverted, and the Materials and Basis of another and a better generated from it: And, last of all, we have seen, how the natural Purposes and Ends, agreeable to this latter State and Scituation of Affairs, have been perpetually frustrated thro' the People's trusting to Men and not to Orders; or thro' their Incapacity and Carelessness to prepare and enforce



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enforce such Orders, as would have certainly and effectually tended to the Preservation and Establishment of a better Constitution; and how, from hence, they have been led on to Faction and Party; and to advance, not the publick Interest, but the Interest of private Persons and Families; an Interest which hath thrown the Nation into one continued Confusion, and made Resentment and Rebellion become habitual to *Britain*.\* It must therefore be no unpleasant or unprofitable Task to attempt a Remedy to these Distractions; to point out those Orders, so much spoke of, and so much wanted; and to regulate and reconcile a jarring and disorder'd People on Principles the most productive of private Happiness and publick Liberty. The Attempt is at least good and reputable; nor shall I be concern'd what Reception it meets with from the Heads and Promoters of Faction, providing it is found worthy of the Acceptance and Approbation of the Honest and Wise, whose Applause and Esteem I desire to obtain and deserve; and having that, shall neither seek nor care for any other.

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\* For the Truth of all these Particulars see Part I. throughout.



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An Alteration in the Possession of national Property occasions an Alteration of Interest; different Interests require different Rules and Orders of Conduct; and a Conduct opposite to natural Interest, tends to the Ruin of the Conductör, or the Subversion of the Interest itself. When the Property of this Nation was invested in the Barons, or Nobility, their Interest was then the proper and natural Object of Government; and Orders, adapted to the Preservation and Support of the then natural Scituation of Property, compos'd the Constitution of that Aristocracy. These Orders were chiefly such as concern'd Property, Manners, and Arms. First, concerning Property, they establish'd a national Intail: Estates went unbroken and undiminish'd from Father to Son, whereby, the Country being once in Possession of the Few, no new Acquisitions could be made; and, without such Acquisition, the Ballance of Power and Interest never could turn against the Nobility; nor did it ever turn, while this Order was observ'd. Secondly, as to Manners, the Nobility, in Parliament assembled, were the absolute and uncontrollable Legislators. They enacted the Conditions of  
their

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their own Obedience, and of the Obedience of the People. They gave, and refused, Supplies to the Prince, as they saw Occasion. They corrected, amended, or made a-new, such Laws as prescrib'd the Terms of Civil Conduct and Behaviour; and these Laws they inforc'd and put in Execution, by Right of their Possessions, in their several Counties and Jurisdictions. The King had no Power, but by his Barons; the Barons had all Power, by their national Property. Thirdly, the Arms were annex'd to the Property of the Country. The Prince could command the Allegiance and Assistance of his Barons; but the Barons were Judges of that Command, how far it was for their Interest, or the Interest of the Nation; and they only could command the Obedience and Respect of the Army, which was made up of their Tenants and Vassals. The Sword was fix'd to the Plow, and the Chiefs of the Plow were the Leaders of the Army.

The first of these Orders prescrib'd and fix'd the Scituation and Circumstances of the Aristocratical Constitution; but, without the Second, the natural Effects of this Order might have been disappointed; and, without the Last,  
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## viii INTRODUCTION.

the two first Orders might have been broke and destroy'd : for a Prince, by the Authority of Law, might have over-thrown the first ; or, by the Edge of the Sword, might have cut off both.

Now, such Princes as made the private Interest of the Crown correspond with the public Orders of the State, and adjusted their Government to the Temper and Laws of the Aristocracy, were of Course honour'd, obey'd, and protected : But such as sought an Interest distinct from the Interest of the Constitution, to rule by Will and not by Law, and to subject the Power of the Nobility to the Power of the Crown, took Art for Nature, and attempting a despotick Administration, without being possess'd of universal Property, oppos'd their Government to the Constitution, a single Force to multiply'd Power ; which, in the Event, turn'd the Resentment of the Constitution against their Government. In this Contention, either the Design of the Prince must have been defeated, or the Constitution itself subverted and chang'd. We have seen how the latter was always, at last, an Overmatch for the former, while the natural Composition



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position remain'd perfect and entire; nor could it have been demolish'd, in any other way, but by following Nature, and altering the Course of the first and last of these fundamental Orders.

Upon the Decline of the Aristocracy, the national Property became popular; hence sprung a popular Interest, and the Materials and Subject of a Democratical Constitution, which still subsist, and are ready to support the Orders and Superstructures of popular Liberty. What these Orders are, we shall now set to View, under the former Articles, namely, such as relate to Property, to Manners, and to Arms.



B C H A P.



## CHAP. I.



PROPERTY gives Rise to Power, Dominion, and Interest; but the immediate Possession of Property, without some Provision and Order whereby the Ballance may remain steady and fix'd, makes its Dominion precarious, its Interest insecure. For in those numberless Chances and Accidents, so intimately connected with human Affairs, so seldom foreseen, and so ill understood by the Bulk of Mankind, the Ballance of this Property may change and be lost, its Dominion and Interest be broke and destroy'd. In the early Ages of Time, when *Ægypt* was the Pride of the World and the Nurse of Science, the Government was such as naturally arose from the Division of Property. The whole Country was distributed into three Parts; one Share belong'd to the Prince, another to the Priesthood, and the third



third to the Body of the People. This Constitution admitting of Liberty, the Crown was oblig'd to submit to Limitation: but, in the Series of political Discipline, a Minister appeared, whose Abilities far exceeded those of his Predecessors; *Joseph*, tho' a Stranger and a Slave, had such signal Endowments, as gain'd him first the Admiration, and afterwards the Confidence of the King. He was rais'd to the Right Hand of *Pharoah*, and by him intrusted with the Management of his Treasury. This Man, foreseeing the Approach of a Famine, erected Store-houses, and made Purchase of Corn all over the Country. By this Means, when the Calamity came upon the Nation, the People, having exhausted the little Stock of Grain they had by them, were necessitated to apply to the Crown, and to purchase at such Prices as the King was pleas'd to prescribe; whence it happen'd, that such exorbitant Rates were set upon the Grain, as spent and consum'd the Riches of the People; and, the Constitution itself being unprovided with Orders for its Security and Continuance, the King accumulated to himself, by way of Purchase and Bargain, the united Property of



his People, remov'd them from their Habitations, and reduc'd them to Slavery. *Rome* may also be instanc'd, upon this Occasion; a State which, having arriv'd at the greatest Heights of Glory and Dominion, was ruin'd and lost through her own Inadvertency and Want of Precaution. In the first Ages of this Commonwealth, Poverty was no Bar to Employments, but Virtue was honour'd in every Rank and Station. The Captains, the Generals, the Saviours of *Rome*, were contented with a few Acres of Land, and could feel the Blessings of a Country Life and Patriot Affection; but, as Conquest and Victory introduc'd Luxury and Refinements, an ambitious Desire of Dominion and Power succeeded these calm and glorious Attachments towards the Happiness and Independency of the Republick. The immense Property, accumulated by the Nobility out of the conquer'd Lands, exceedingly over-ballanc'd the small Parcels of Territory assign'd to the People; and by supplying the Wants and Necessities of the latter, upon the base Conditions of Usury and Extortion, the little Property they had was in a great Measure extinguish'd. Hence came Dependence and Slavery.

Slavery. Hence the Influence and Power of the Nobility to overthrow the *Gracchi* and the Plea of the People. Hence a *Marius*, a *Scylla*, and a *Cataline*. Hence the Aristocratical Tyranny of the *Triumvirate*, which ended in the absolute and Blood-sucking Dominion of *Cæsar* and the Emperors. Then rush'd on the Northern Adventurers, and routed and destroy'd the *Roman* Empire. These Adventurers, tho' under Discipline and military Orders, were in a State of Liberty, and on Terms of mutual Paction and Agreement. The Conquests made were for the Use of the Community, and the Spoils of War were assign'd and divided by the Voice of the People : But having settled in the conquer'd Countries, without making Provision for their future Security, it afterwards happen'd, that, as the Country, by unforeseen Fraud or Force, fell into the Hands of the Prince or Nobility, the Community itself was reduc'd to Subjection and Slavery. *Italy* fell to the Share of the High Priest ; *France* and *Spain*, after many internal Struggles, became each the Property of its Nobility ; and *Germany* is, at this Day, the awkward Affociation of arbitrary and incompatible Interests, bearing



bearing the genuine Resemblance of *Roman* Freedom under Imperial Tyranny. *Greece*, on the other Hand, was fruitful in producing many opposite Changes. That Country was at first under the Dominion of many single Hands; but the Property, which the People were possess'd of, gave them Spirit enough at last to throw off the Yoke, and to fix a natural and free Constitution, by endearing Associations of mutual Defence and Protection. It would be needless, at present, to recount the various Circumstances of all the free States erected in this Country: As a Pattern and Copy of the whole, we shall only make Mention of *Lacedemon* and *Athens*. Each of these aim'd at preventing unjust Accumulation and private Superiority; but, differing in their Genius and Circumstances, went different ways to Work. The *Lacedemonians*, at the Institution of their Government, were of uncorrupted Manners, and Lovers of a Country Life; nor was the Country itself so accumulated by particular Persons, as to enable them to oppose, or controul, the Designs of the Prince; whence *Lycurgus* had it in his Power, not only to create, but to fix, a Constitution.

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He accomplish'd the first of these, by dividing the Territory equally among his Citizens; and the latter, by appropriating that Territory to them and their Heirs for ever, that is, by forbidding Accumulation, and prohibiting the Use of Money. But *Athens* was under very opposite Circumstances from *Sparta*. For, with a Refinement of Taste, she was improv'd in Arts and Science beyond all other States in *Greece*; whence she could not submit to Restraints in Acquisition, as by such Acquisition she purchas'd all her Enjoyments: but yet, desirous of Liberty, she establish'd her Freedom by the Institution of the *Ostracism*, whereby she banish'd every Citizen suspected of Ambition. These Cities were each of them eminent and powerful; nor did they fall by any other Means, than thro' mutual Rivalship and Desire of Dominion. *Athens* became first subject to the Yoke, but she bury'd in her Ruins the Liberties of *Sparta*. Nor can we omit here to observe the Excellency of *Lycurgus's* Laws, by the Influence of which that State did so long flourish, and thro' the Non-observance of which she so soon fell. *Lycurgus* had prohibited the *Lacedemonians* the Use of Money; for

for her Territory, being small, might in Time have been over-ballanc'd, and the Commonwealth destroy'd, by the Increase of Treasure and Riches : And so true, and so just, was this Institution, that no sooner had she accepted of the wealthy Spoils of *Athens*, and abolish'd the ancient Policy of Impropropriations, but she lost her former Virtue, and became the Prey of Ambition. Nay, let us but reflect on what we have already discuss'd at very great Length, I mean the Scituation and Circumstances of our own ancient Nobility, when the Ballance of Property was inherent in them and their Heirs for ever, till such Time as those Orders were broke, whereby their Power and Interest was secured, and an Opportunity given to the People of sharing, and at last over-ballancing, their Dominion ; and we shall be convinc'd from that, as well as from the Circumstances and Events of every People and Country, how liable to Alteration every Constitution is, while the Property of the State remains unsecur'd, or while the Orders of Government oppose such Security ; and how fix'd and certain the Condition of every State must be, whose Orders are adapted properly to its natural Scituation,

We



We are at present in a State of Liberty, the Property of our Country is ballanc'd on the Side of the People; but many are the possible Cases how this Ballance may be broke, and the Country again revert and be impropriated into lordly Intails; or the Seigniorial Possession of a single Hand. We have the Experience and Events of past Ages; the interesting Prospect of our own present Enjoyments, the worthy and glorious Affection of conveying and confirming future Happiness and Tranquility to our Relations, Kindred, and Posterity; We have, I say; all these to excite and persuade us to every fair and probable Measure for Security. On the other Hand, we labour under none of the Inconveniencies and Dangers of *Sparta*; We need prohibit no Trade, no Business, no Riches whatever: for our Territory and Dominion, being large and extensive, is incapable of being over-ballanc'd by any Quantity of Treasure; our Scituation is such as encourages Trade, encourages Industry, and every Art and Science; and the Means to secure these Blessings, and to secure our Scituation, are all of them founded in the most strict and

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impartial Justice; in short, it is only requisite to institute the following Orders.

*First, concerning the Descent or Distribution of Property.*

*That every Person, having upwards of 1. per Annum of Land Estate in Great Britain, and 1. per Annum Land Estate in Ireland, dispose of the same, at the Time of his Death, in such Manner, as, in case of Sons, the Share of the eldest exceed not the said Sum of 1. and 1. per Annum, in the respective Countries aforesaid.*

*That when the Estate or Estates of any Person shall amount to more, than what will produce to each of his Sons the said Sums of 1. in Britain, or 1. in Ireland; it shall be lawful for such Father to divide the same equally among them.*

*That such Estates as are less, or exceed not the yearly Sums aforesaid, be inherited in such Manner, as that the eldest Son have a double Share, but not more; and the younger Sons obtain each an equal Share of the Remainder.*

*That the personal Estate of every Man descend and be divided among his Sons and Daughters, according to the Proportion observed*

*serv'd in the last Article ; and that the Daughters, in such Division, be entitled to the same Share and Right as younger Sons.*

*Providing always, that in case of any single Child, whether Son or Daughter, the said Child may lawfully inherit and enjoy the Father's Fortunes intire and undiminish'd ; and in case of Daughters without Sons, that all of them be equally Heiresses : As also, That every Man have the same Power of disposing and bequeathing of his Property, real or personal, to whatever Person or Persons he shall think worthy of his Favour ; and to make such Distinction between the Merits of his Children, as to him shall seem good, and as he might have done at any Time heretofore, providing he observe, in such extraordinary Distribution and Affection, the Extent and Bounds before set forth, and not exceed the same.*

*Secondly, concerning the Purchase, or Acquisition, of Property.*

*That no Person presume, on any Pretence whatever, to buy or purchase for himself, in the Kingdom of Great Britain, an Estate in Land, exceeding the said Sum of* 1. per An-



num; or in Ireland, exceeding two Thirds of the said annual Sum of 1.

*That whoever shall be possess'd of Land Estates, in the said Kingdoms of Britain and Ireland, to the Extent aforesaid, either by Gift, Legacy, or Inheritance; Let it be unlawful for such Persons to make any new Acquisition or Purchase: Or if the Estates, so given or bequeathed, be under the Rates above stated; Let it be unlawful for such Persons to purchase more, than what shall make the same amount to the Values aforesaid.*

*But whoever hath more than one Son, may purchase for each of them, in the Kingdoms aforesaid, Estates as above describ'd, the Investiture being in their Persons and to their Use allennarly.*

*Lastly, That, in case of the Eviction of Property to the Use of the Crown, by Rebellion or otherwise, the same shall upon no Pretext, or Consideration whatever, be annex'd to the Crown; but shall be set to Sale, or at the Pleasure of the Prince given to such Persons, as he shall think proper Objects of his Favour and Benevolence, and that within six Months after the legal Eviction.*

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We need not illustrate how these Orders prevent undue Accumulation, and keep the Ballance of Property perpetually floating in the Scale of the People. The obvious Sense and Meaning of these Orders fully demonstrate, how impracticable it must be, whilst they are in Force, for private Interest, or private Power, to supercede and overcome, in a natural Way, the publick Good and national Strength of the Community. Let us only remark, so far as relates to the Distribution and Acquisition of Property, the Inconsistency of our present Laws with our present natural Constitution.

First, our Law, as it stands at present, gives to the eldest Son his Father's Inheritance without Diminution. This was a wise and a good Order under the Aristocratical Constitution; for, by transmitting the Property from Father to Son, the Influence and Power of the few Proprietors remain'd unalterably fix'd: The younger Children depended upon the first born, were maintain'd at his Table, and supported at his Expence. He was the Guardian, the Protector, and Patriarch, of the Family. But now, when Property hath circulated into the  
Hands

Hands of the People, and the general Interest of the Commonwealth is become the natural and true Policy of the State, to continue and follow forth the ancient Orders of Succession, is to oppose and subvert a popular Foundation by Aristocratical Superstructures. It is as unjust and unnatural, as it is destructive and impolitic. According to the Measures of Justice and Equity, Children, consider'd as such, have all of them a like Relation to their Parent, and are equally entitled to his Affection and Esteem. Extraordinary Merit and Virtue may reasonably excite a stronger Regard for one Child than another, but no Degree of Merit whatever can justify a Father in raising the State and Fortune of one of his Children at the Expence and Exclusion of all the rest; because, by rewarding Merit at such Rate, the natural and universal Laws of Affection and Regard towards the Happiness and Welfare of the Offspring are broke and transgress'd. But if even the greatest Degrees of Virtue and Worth cannot excuse so extravagant and unequal a Preference, with how much less Reason can the fortuitous, accidental, and unforeseen Ability and Merit of a First-born lay Claim, or be intitled



intituled to so barbarous a Monopoly. Let us admit, but admit it only for the Sake of Argument, that the Lustre, the Dignity, the Fame of the Parent, is preserv'd to after Ages compleat and intire, by transmitting his universal Property to the elder Son: But what Fore-sight or Prevention can save this Heir and his Fortunes from being lost and destroy'd by rebelling perhaps against a good Administration, or by gallantly opposing a bad one? Were there not, in our own Country, so many Instances and Examples of the Extinction and Ruin of Families, Titles and Fortunes, by the single Transgression, and sometimes Merit, of the Heir; I should have recollected Cases from some distant Age to inforce my Argument: But, in Truth, this Manner of transmitting Estates is far from preserving either the Dignity or Power of the Family; for the Heir cannot now by Law, nor will his own Extravagance permit him to support and retain his particular Family and Clan at his own Expence; Wherefore they, to supply their Wants, must naturally betake themselves to Court, and depend upon the Benevolence of the Prince; and, by being thus fix'd to the

Side



Side of his Passions and Interest, must acquire an Interest and a Leading detach'd from, and often oppos'd to, the Interest of the Heir. Whence it appears that all this Family Dignity, so much endeavour'd and so much aim'd at, is at best but precariously convey'd by a single Person; and that the real Family is, by this Means, reduc'd to Poverty, or Dependence. In this, as in all other Cases, to follow Nature, to preserve natural Affection and natural Love, is the most certain Method whereby to establish Family Grandeur and Family Interest; to make the Children Sharers of the Fortune, as well as of the Blood, of the Parent; and establish Succession by these, or by Orders to the like Effect with these already mention'd. For, supposing such Orders to take Place, let us compare their Effects with the Effects of those now in Being. At present the Father, over-looking his younger Sons, conveys the whole of his Possessions to his First-born. Now, should this Heir Paramount prove lavish, extravagant, and consume this Fortune; where then will be the Grandeur, where the Dignity, where the Interest, of this Family? But was the Father to divide this Estate equal-  
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ly among his Sons, or so to divide it as to assign to the elder a certain superior Portion only; must not the Parent have, in this Case, the greatest moral Certainty, that his Name and his Family will continue and flourish? Must he not have as many more Chances for this happening, than he can have the other Way, as there are Sons who inherit the Estate? And, what is beyond all, must not this Manner of dividing Inheritance promote Freedom, Independency and Trade, by setting the Children from the very Beginning above the hard Necessity of Ministerial Pay and Court Servility, and by enabling them to pursue Merchandize and Trade, so as to enlarge and increase the national Riches, already acquir'd by former Industry and Traffic?

But, Secondly, as to the Acquisition of Property; there is, at present, no Bounds set by Law to Accumulation. Now, in this unlimited Condition of Things, there is the strongest Presumption and the strongest Reason to think, that the present Ballance may change, and the present natural Constitution transpire, into the former Aristocracy; or, which is worse, into a modern Tyranny: I say, there is the strong-

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est Reason to think it; because, in all Ages and in all Countries, the Scituation and Circumstances of People have been found to alter and change, in Proportion as they were without Orders, or as the Orders fixing their Scituation were weak, unsufficient, or broke. Of this we have particular Instances in *Ægypt*, *Greece*, *Rome*, and our own Country: even the Universe itself exists and depends upon Orders, fitly adapted to the several Ends and Purposes of its Existence; which Orders, were they but dissolv'd by the divine Fabricator, the present Action, Regularity, and Connexion of Bodies must also be dissolv'd and lost. This Alteration in the Ballance may happen at some Time or other in the Course of legal Acquisition, but it also may happen otherwise. Let us suppose that in some future Reign, the present Tenor of Things being continued, a constitutional Rebellion shall break out; for a Rebellion of this Sort may happen, and did happen: Let us suppose, I say, that a Rebellion shall happen, upon Revolution Principles, under a King, who shall aim at Prerogative and Power, inconsistent with Liberty and Property; and let us also suppose, that the Prince,  
by



by Reason of a powerful Army and a powerful Dependence, overcomes the Opposition of a raw, undisciplin'd, and enervated People; may not the Forfeitures arising from such a Rebellion, and distributed among those who stood firm by the Crown, being added to such Estates as they enjoy'd before by Inheritance or rightful Possession, throw the Ballance of the Nation into the Hands of the Few? Or may not such Forfeitures thus lawfully accruing to the Prince, by being annex'd to the Crown and appropriated allennarly to the Use of the Sovereign, throw the Ballance entirely on himself; and enable him, by his own personal Dominion, to establish and support a Tyranny as absolute and independent, as any *Eastern* Monarch? That these are no chimerical or imaginary Cases, let us recall to Mind an Instance or two in our own History. When *William* the *Norman* laid Claim to the Crown, and had defeated his Competitor *Harrold*, he invested the forfeited Estates, of those who had espous'd the Cause of *Harrold*, in the Persons of his *Norman* Adventurers; and, by so doing, gave them a national Foundation. Then a Competition arose between the national and

foreign Nobility ; but such was the good Fortune of that Prince, that, by suppressing many Risings and Rebellions after his Accession to the Crown, he turn'd the Ballance of Property and national Power into the Hands of his *Normans*. These *Normans* did indeed, in after Times, maintain the Dignity and Independency of the Aristocracy, as fiercely against the Crown, as did the old *English* Barons ; but this happen'd after they had been firmly establish'd in their Possessions, and were thoroughly naturaliz'd, and when both Sides were equally convinc'd, that their joint Interest consisted in defending their common Privileges and Property from the Encroachments and Usurpations of the Crown : Yet the Effects of Success on the Side of the Crown, as to Property, was the same, as tho' the Balance of Property had been taken from the People and establish'd in the Aristocracy. And to make this still more plain, let us suppose, what no reasonable Man can fairly deny to have been possible, *viz.* That King *James* had got the better of his Subjects, who enter'd into the Revolutionary Rebellion : Then might he not, by seizing on a few, or most, or all  
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of the largest Fortunes belonging to his Rebel Subjects, have remov'd the People's Ballance of Property into the Scale of the Nobility; or, by keeping them in his own Person, secur'd that Ballance, and with it the consequent Dominion, to himself and his Posterity; and at the same Time had the Face to set forth his Plea of Mercy and Forgiveness, because perhaps, from Reasons of State, he had spar'd the Lives of the far greater Part of such, as in Law might have been convicted of Treason?

In short, by distributing Property according to Nature, and limiting Acquisition by the Temper and Circumstances of our present Situation, the national Ballance and the national Constitution may be preserv'd and promoted; but, by continuing in the old beaten Tract of present Custom and present Law, they may, and in the common Course of Things must, be subverted and overthrown.





## C H A P. II.

**N**EXT to establishing the Power and Interest of the State, by fixing Property on a publick Foundation; ought the Manners, or political Genius and Virtue of the People, to be taken Care of. By the political Manners and Genius of a People, I understand that Inclination and Disposition which they bear towards the Community or Publick. We have by Nature a publick Feeling and publick Affections. Whoever candidly consults his own Breast, or reviews his own Conduct and Behaviour, will be convinc'd, on a thousand Occasions, of the Force and Energy of these Principles, in a greater or lesser Degree. Some have prov'd themselves strong and insurmountable in all their publick Characters and Actions; insurmountable even by the most vigorous and alluring Temptations: Some have fallen short, through mistaken but prevalent Views of private Happiness and Interest; but  
 none

none are so deprav'd and lost to all Sense of Honour and Virtue, but in their Hearts and upon Reflection must love and admire the generous and disinterested Character; approve and applaud the Hero and the Patriot. We can never intirely throw off Nature. She will force herself upon us at some Time, and in some Shape or other. If we cannot be thoroughly virtuous and honest, if we cannot comprehend a publick Interest, and act originally and primarily from Motives national and disinterested, we will still move in some Circle or other of Affection and Benevolence, however narrow and contracted it may be; we will affect some Sect and Party, espouse some little Cause and Interest within the Compass of our Knowledge and Ability. Publick and private Affections, when rightly understood, conduce to the same End. Most Men are convinc'd of this in some Degree or other. They are convinc'd, for Instance, that what is detrimental to the Trade or Business in general which they follow, is hurtful to themselves and their own particular Interest. They are eager and diligent to redress such a Grievance, and seldom remain easy or satisfy'd till once they have got  
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the better of it; but they cannot commonly so well observe; nor so nicely connect, the Relation and Dependance betwixt themselves and the whole Community. The Commonwealth wears a large and complicated Form; too big for their Conception, too intricate for their Discernment: Wherefore, fancying that human Affairs and the Circumstances of their Country always were, and always will be, as they are at present, give themselves no farther Concern, and thence are easily carried off by a Bribe, a Post, or a Pension; hence become attach'd to private Parties and private Interests; hence warp themselves into obsequious Principles of Compliance and Resignation; and put in Practice the hopeful Project of aggrandizing themselves and Family on the Subversion of Liberty and Ruin of their Country. But the glorious Intention of Government is, to cherish and strengthen Nature, to establish private upon publick Happiness, and by promoting the Interest of the whole to advance and confirm the Interest of every Part. When the Passions and Temper of a People are such as greatly and disinterestedly affect the Prosperity and Interest of the Commonwealth, when they  
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are such as affect national Freedom and national Glory above every other View and Consideration ; then are the Manners of that People fitted to a publick Foundation, to a popular Ballance and Constitution : But when they are such as affect personal Ease, private Pleasure, Family Interest and Grandeur, above every generous and publick Object of Duty and Respect, then are the Manners of that People adapted to create, or to support, a Princely Ballance ; an oppressive, arbitrary, and tyrannical Constitution. And whether we argue from Reason or Experience, whether from what has happen'd in other Countries and in former Ages, or from what has happen'd here at Home and in the present Times, we shall find, that a Corruption of Manners tended, and does tend, to weaken publick Interest and Liberty, and to promote private Power and Oppression. *Greece* and *Rome* present us at this Day with the sad and miserable Effects of Corruption and Depravity. *Greece* could once withstand and baffle the united Power of *Persia*, but that was when her Leaders and Commanders had Spirit and Virtue to reject and despise the most high, the most royal Temp-

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tations ; when neither the Daughter, Dominions, nor Treasure, of the most powerful and most magnificent Prince on Earth could shake or influence a Nation loving Virtue ; when the heroic and divine *Leonidas* could offer up himself a willing Sacrifice for the Safety and Preservation of his People ; when the brave and gallant *Aristides* could forgive the Jealousy of his Countrymen, forget the Disgrace of Banishment, and chearfully return to protect and save his Country : But no sooner was Corruption of Manners introduc'd, than that brave and free People, became weak and pusillanimous, Servants and Slaves. *Rome* also was once the Pride and Glory of the World. Her Manners and Virtue rais'd and adorn'd her. When for Tyranny she expell'd *Tarquin*, so much did the Love of Liberty prevail, that not a common Citizen was found to embrace the Cause of the royal Spoiler. Two young Noblemen indeed declar'd for him ; but the Father of these Noblemen, the magnanimous *Brutus*, wip'd the Stain from his Family, and the Imputation from himself, by gloriously decreeing the Death, and by the Hands of his *Lictors* shedding the Blood, of these degenerate

rate Sons. In short, such was the Honesty, such the Honour, of the ancient *Romans*, that when *Camillus*, who had vow'd a Temple to *Apollo* from the Plunder of *Veientum*, acquainted the Senate of his Vow, and demanded so much of the Plunder as would enable him to perform it; the Senate, notwithstanding the Army had already seiz'd this Plunder, not only decreed a Tenth of the Spoil to *Camillus*, but could put so much Faith and Confidence in the Soldiery, as to leave it to themselves to compute and levy it at their own Discretion. But unhappy and unfortunate was the future Fate of *Rome*, for at length she forgot and lost her Sanctity of Manners; and that very People, and that very Senate, became enamour'd of Bribes, and corrupted by Luxury. The People first suffer'd, and next the Senators; the former by being made Dependants to the Nobility, the latter by being made the Slaves of Tyrants: And hence the Scymeter gave Law to *Greece*, the Rack to *Italy*. These Consequences were foreseen and thought of, but by a few, too few to force back the Tide of Corruption. They did all that Men could do. They advis'd, they fought, they died



for their Country. But the Bulk of the Nation was then infatuated, imagining what never was, nor ever can be, that the Interest of the Publick was inconsistent with their own; or, at least, that private Interest might remain perfect and secure, tho' the Publick went to Wreck and Destruction. But their Children retracted these Opinions, retracted them indeed when it was too late, when they saw their Lives and Fortunes depend upon the Nod, and themselves intirely destitute of Force to withstand the Violence, of Imperial Tyrants. Then became they sensible of the Virtue and Worth of a *Brutus* and *Cato*, but no such Worth and Virtue were then to be found.

In all States, Corruption and Depravity of Manners proceed either from an unequal Distribution of Property, or from unequal and inconsistent Orders, or from both. The first of these hath already been pretty fully treated, under the former Article of Property; and, to display and evidence the second, we shall at present confine ourselves to *Rome* and our own Country.

In a free State, the Orders are said to be unequal and inconsistent, when, in the Course of Govern-

Government and Administration, any View or Interest, besides that of the Publick, can be promoted and pursued with Impunity: For inasmuch as private Views and Interests supersede and take Place of publick *Affections* and common Good, insomuch does the free State become deprav'd in its political Virtue, and hastens to its final Dissolution by a single Hand. By the Civil Orders of *Rome*, First, *Magistracy* was confin'd to the Senate, the Senatorial Dignity made perpetual in the Families of a few, and the People absolutely excluded and made incapable of both. Secondly, The Result or final Decrees of the State remained with the People, and were given, not by a Representation, but by the whole Body assembled under their several Divisions and Tribes. Now, by circulating the Honours and Offices of the State through the Hands of a few, these two Inconveniences naturally followed, and produc'd an inevitable Inequality. First, Merit in the Plebeians remain'd undiscover'd, or, if discover'd, remain'd without its proper Reward and Applause: They might fight, and bleed, and perish for the Publick, but could partake of no national Honours, no eminent Employments:

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This open and insurmountable Discouragement to Virtue created in the People a Habit of Remissness, and fitted them rather to the Discipline and Subjection of an Aristocracy, than to the Virtue and Government of a Commonwealth. *Secondly*, The superior Privileges and high Prerogatives of the Patricians induc'd them to pursue an Interest separate from the Interest of the State ; induc'd them to think meanly of the People, and too highly of themselves ; to respect Birth and Rank more than Merit and Virtue ; and to aggrandize and secure their own private and Family Honours, by impoverishing the People, and robbing the Publick of its Lands and Treasure. These Things were not immediately felt ; and, 'till felt, not observ'd. While *Tarquin* liv'd, the Senators and Patricians were truly Fathers and Guardians of the State ; but when that Pretender dy'd, and the Patricians had nothing to fear, they squeez'd, and rack'd, and imprison'd the People ; imprison'd them for Debts contracted by fighting the Battles of the Commonwealth ; Debts, which they could not pay, because those very Creditors, who now seiz'd on their Persons, had beforehand seiz'd on their just Property,

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the conquer'd Lands. These Insults made the People, at last, sensible of the bad Condition of their Affairs; and when the Enemy approach'd the Gates, not a Citizen would stir in Defence of the City. Hence sprung a Contest betwixt the Senate and People, the Result of which was, that the Senate granted to the People the Privilege of electing from among themselves Tribunes, or Officers, to preside in their Assemblies, and take Care of their Interests. The People afterwards obtain'd of the Senate, by like Struggles, the Privilege of being admitted into all the public Magistracies and Employments: But the Effect of all these Approaches towards an Equality in the Civil Orders, and a common Interest in the Government, was broke and lost by the Nature of, and Manner wherein was held, the popular Assembly; for that Assembly, as already mentioned, consisted of the whole Body of the People, and was thereby not only irregular and tumultuous, but, giving Suffrage in open View and in Presence of the Competitors, was liable to be corrupted or over-aw'd by Patrons: For such was the Law, and such the constant Practice of that Republick, that every Plebeian  
made

made Choice of some Patrician or other to defend him in all Prosecutions, and to plead the Law for him in all Suits; and the elected Patrician supported and defended the Plebeian without Gratuity or Reward. Hence the Patricians were termed Patrons, the People, Clients; and such was the undue Influence of this judicial Institution, that the Client was incapacitated to swear in any Cause against his Patron; but the Patron had, whenever he stood in Need of it, the Vote, the Interest, the Purse, and Person of his Client; for that Client was abhorr'd, and look'd upon as infamous, who, upon any Account whatsoever, deserted his Patron. And, what was equally inconvenient, the Senate, when at any time afraid of being worsted by the Suffrage of the People, had it almost ever in its Power, by caressing, bribing, or over-awing some one or other of the Tribunes, to dismiss the popular Assembly, and evade the Decree of the People. Indeed, when the Commonwealth increas'd, the Assembly consisted of a sort of Representation, but such as made the Case rather worse than before; for a few *Tribes* (as they happen'd to turn up by Lot) gave Suffrage for the whole People.

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Now this Method labour'd not only under all the Inconveniencies of the former, but had this additional Disadvantage, that the Majority of these Tribes might be easier influenc'd, than the Majority of the People: and, abstracting from all Influence, the Interest of these few voting Tribes might, on many Occasions, be contrary and inconsistent with the Interest of the whole People; as contrary, and as inconsistent, as the Interest of a few *British* Counties to the Interest of the *British* Nation. Whoever traces the Exploits and History of the *Romans* will see more particularly, and much more affectingly, how this Inequality of Civil Orders gave Rise to seperate Interests; and, these Interests opposing one another, how the Distress and Jealousy of the People was perpetually augmented by the Power and Ambition of a few Nobility; how Virtue and Honour were contaminated; and how at last, by continuing Magistracy too long in single Hands, the Commonwealth was master'd and destroy'd.

We of *Britain* are not only much more happy, than the *Romans* were, in our Approaches towards an Equality of Ballance, but



likewise in this respect, the Transition from the Civil Orders we have already, to those which we ought to have, is much more natural and easy in our State, than it ever was in theirs. The single Difference between our Orders now, and those we enjoy'd under the Aristocracy, is, that the Commons are now one chief Part of the Legislature, and enact their own Laws, in place of having Laws impos'd upon them by the Power and Influence of others; but the Form of Meeting, and the Manner of Representation, is the same. Like *Rome*, we have a perpetual Senate, and a popular Assembly; and, like *Sparta*, the Administration of our Laws is hereditary in the Family of our King. But our Orders are better suited, in several Respects, to the Temper and Genius of a free People, than were those of *Greece* and *Rome*. First, our Senate, tho' perpetual, excludes not the People, but is supply'd and increas'd by nobilitated Commoners; and tho' the Honours and Privileges of our Peerage are hereditary, yet are they wholly confin'd to the Person of the Heir, and diminish not, nor impare, the native Dignity of the People; for the very Blood of a *British* Senator, in the second or  
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third Branch, returns to its first Source, and makes one Stream with the Blood of the Commons; and the Commons themselves being naturally worthy and honourable, by reason of their Ballance in Property, are neither despis'd by the Nobility, nor are the Nobility suspected by them. Secondly, our popular Assembly, being compos'd of a Representation from every Part of the Country, partakes neither of the unavoidable Confusion of the *Roman* Assembly, where the whole People conven'd; nor of the Partiality of the *Roman* Representation by Tribes. Thirdly, our Prince being single and one, our State is free from the Family Competition of *Sparta's* Kings. Thus far are we happy above *Lacedemon* and *Rome*, but we must stop here, and go no farther; for, notwithstanding of these Advantages, we have been, and are now, hast'ning to meet their Fate: For tho' the Orders we have are intrinsically good, yet wanting others to support and preserve them, they must run from their just Byass, and become unequal. Have we not seen how the Crown, and the Ministers of the Crown, by virtue of Royal Prerogative and Privilege, oppos'd their own private Interest



to the publick Interest of the Community ; and, by Posts, and Places, and Titles of Honour, affected to raise their own Power and Dignity above the Rights and Liberties of the People? Have we not seen how, Things being brought to the last Extremity, that Tyranny was dissolv'd, that Family excluded, and a new Race of Princes fix'd upon the Throne? Have we not seen how these very Revolution Princes, one after another, by exceeding in Power, and multiplying the annual Revenue, have put it in the Power of their Ministers to introduce a national Depravity of Manners, to seduce or over-awe the native Freedom of popular Elections, and to subvert and destroy the Honour and Integrity of the popular Representation? Have we not seen how, by this unequal and deprav'd Influence of the Crown, the People have been inflam'd and divided, Faction promoted, and Treasons and Rebelions excited and multiply'd? 'Tis from the Inequality of our Orders, 'tis from the iniquitous and private Influence of the Crown, that all our present internal Calamities flow, and will and must flow ; for, while that Influence continues, our Morality will every Day decay, our  
 People



People will turn worse and worse, one Year after another will produce greater Demands from the Crown and greater Compliances by the People. Ministers may be chang'd one after another, popular Clamour may be rais'd against particular Persons in Power; but unless the People and the Representatives of the People, the Electors and the Electd, be secur'd by their Orders against the Influence of all Ministers whatever, and against Bribery and Corruption of every Kind, the Nation never can be out of Trouble, never free from Danger: And, to secure them effectually, we need neither raise the Power of the People beyond what it is, nor depress in any Degree the legal Authority of the Prince; let us only preserve the just Rights and Independency of all Parts of the Legislature by the following Orders.

*First, concerning the Manner of taking the Votes of the Electors of Great Britain, and of both Houses of Parliament.*

*That the Electors of all the Counties, Cities, and Boroughs of Great Britain chuse their Representatives, or Members of Parliament, as follows, namely; That the whole Freeholders or Electors of every County, City, and Borough, be-*  
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*ing assembled at their respective Places upon the Day of Election, begin by drawing Lots for three several Proposers; That the Persons, upon whom the said Lots shall fall, take the Oath of Allegiance, as also another, to be likewise administered by the Sheriff, importing, that the Persons whom they shall propose as Candidates, for representing the County, City, or Borough to which they belong, shall be, to the best of their Knowledge, such as are able and fit to serve their Country in Parliament; and that they have neither got any Reward from these Persons, nor from any Person or Persons in their Name, nor stand in Expectation by Promise or otherways from them or any on their Behalf, of any future Favour or Reward, for proposing them as Candidates; which Oaths being taken, the said Proposers shall retire apart by themselves, to consider of the Persons proper to be nominated as Candidates; and, each of them having fix'd upon one, they shall set down their Names in Writing; he, upon whom the first Lot fell, setting down the Name of his Candidate first, and so on in Order; which Nomination of Candidates, being thus made out, the three Proposers shall return, and deliver their List to the Sheriff, who, having*



ing read the same to the Electors, shall call upon each of the Candidates, in the Order set down in the List, who shall make Oath one by one, in Presence of all the Freeholders and Electors, that they are each of them, after all Debts and Incumbrances paid and clear'd, worth 600l. per Annum, if for a County; or 300l. per Annum, if for a City, or Borough: Which Oath, if refus'd, the Person so refusing shall thereby become incapable of standing Candidate, and the Proposer, who nam'd him, shall directly proceed and nominate another; and when the Candidates, nam'd by the Proposers, have taken the last mention'd Oath, they shall retire, while the Electors, beginning with the Person first propos'd, and ending with the last propos'd, shall ballot, whether these Persons shall be sustained as Candidates or not; and he, who shall have above one half of the Suffrages for him, shall be mark'd as a Candidate; but he, who shall have only the one half or under, shall be rejected; and the Proposer, who nominated him, shall proceed, as before, and nominate another, until three Persons, thus nominated by the Proposers, shall be sustain'd as Candidates by the Electors. Then shall the Electors again Ballot, which of the three

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*Candidates shall be their Representative in Parliament; and he of the three, who upon the whole shall have the Majority of Suffrages, shall be return'd by the Sheriff as duly elected; the Sheriff, or his Depute, being always oblig'd to number the Suffrages, in Presence and under the Inspection of all the Electors; and the Person, thus elected, shall immediately, and in Presence of his Constituents, make Oath, That, in all his future Conduct in Parliament, he will, to the utmost of his Power, study and act for the Happiness and Good of his Country, and punctually observe and obey all such Directions and Instructions, as he shall from time to time receive from his County, City, or Borough, concerning publick and national Affairs. When the whole Representation of the People are thus chose and assembled in Parliament, the Lords, as well as the Commons, shall, in deciding on all Affairs to be brought before them, give their Opinions on the same, not by voting, but by balloting; and the Suffrages of the Lords, so to be given, shall be publickly examin'd and number'd by the Lord Chancellor, in Presence and under the Inspection of the whole House; and, in the House of Commons, the same shall be done by*  
*Mr.*

*Mr. Speaker, in Presence and under Inspection of their House.*

*Secondly, concerning the Qualification of Members of Parliament.*

*That every Person, representing a County, have at least 600l. per Annum free Estate; and every Person, representing a City or Borough, 300l. per Annum. That no Person, having any Post or Pension under his Majesty, be capable of being elected a Member of Parliament; or being a Member, and accepting of such Post or Pension, be capable of being re-elected, while he continues under such presumptive Influence. That no Person, having serv'd in one Parliament, be capable of being elected to serve in the next ensuing; but that, next Parliament being expir'd, he may lawfully stand Candidate, and be elected into the next following.*

*Thirdly, concerning the Duration and Succession of Parliaments.*

*That the Parliament continue for the Space of three Years compleat, yet in that Time be diversify'd as follows; namely, One third Part of the House of Commons shall move off at the End of the first Year, and be supply'd by a new third Part, sent up from the several Counties, Cities,*

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*and Boroughs, but elected to serve three Years ; and one third Part shall move off at the End of the second Year, and be supply'd as before ; and the last third Part, which compleats the first Parliament, shall move off at the End of the third Year, and be succeeded as above. Whence it is evident that the Parliament, at the Beginning of the fourth Year, will consist entirely of new, tho' not of unexperienc'd Members ; as also that the first Quota sent up of this new Parliament, having already sat two Years in the House, their Time of Service will be expir'd at the end of the fourth Year, and a new Succession take Place ; and the second Quota, having already serv'd one Year, their Time will expire at the End of the fifth Year, and a new Succession arise ; and the third Quota, having not yet serv'd at all, their Time won't expire till the End of the sixth Year, and then will others succeed them : And thus shall the Parliament be for ever renew'd, and for ever in Being. And for the better effecting of the said orderly Succession in Parliament, Be it enacted, That every County, City, and Borough, send each of them up to the first Parliament three Members, (to be chose in the Manner above set forth in the*  
*first*



*first Order) electing one to be their Representative for one Year, a second for two, and the third for the full Term of three Years compleat; observing, ever after, to send up annually each of them one, for the Term of three Years, to succeed to the Member annually going out of the House of Commons.\**

*Fourthly, concerning the Period of Elections.*

*That a Time be fix'd by Parliament for making these annual Elections, at which Time it shall be lawful for the Freeholders and Electors*

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\* This Manner of Representation by annual, duennial, and triennial Parliaments, might also be form'd without augmenting the Members for the Boroughs beyond what they are at present: For by convening the three next contiguous Boroughs together throughout the whole Kingdom, and appointing the most central Town for the Place of Election, it would then happen, that every three Boroughs throughout *England* would, by their present Privileges, send up to Parliament, according to the above Method, six Members the first Year, and two Members every Year thereafter; and in *Scotland*, by convening six Boroughs together in the same Manner, at the Times of Election, the like Proportion would be observ'd. This Method of Representation would, it is true, lessen the Number of Members of Parliament propos'd by the Order: For by the Order the whole Amount of the *British* Representation would be 954, whereas this Amendment, by subtracting the Borough Augmentation, reduces the Representation to 764; but then the annual Charge of the Parliament is also, by this Amendment, lower'd from 361800 to 304800 *l.* and the Augmentation plac'd, where it ought to be, that is, on the Side of the Counties and Cities.

*of the several Counties, and Cities, and Boroughs, of Great Britain, to meet yearly; and, with, or without the King's Writ, elect their Members and Representatives in Parliament.*

*Fifthly, concerning the Expence of Members of Parliament.*

*That every Member for a County, in Parliament, receive from the said County, annually, the Sum of 600l. and that every Member for a City or Borough, in Parliament, receive from his respective City or Borough, annually, 300l. to defray the necessary Expence, attending the Service of their Country in Parliament.*

These Orders tend all to one and the same Point, to retrieve and to preserve Liberty, Honour, and Independency. They are founded on the natural Circumstances and Situation of the People, on the Principles of the late Revolution and our present illustrious Settlement. But this will more distinctly appear, by considering the natural Effects these Orders must have upon the Temper and Morality of the People. Let us suppose then, that these Orders shall take Place, and that the Vanity, the Ambition, the Avarice, or the Court Expectation of some Man, shall prompt him to  
set



set about to make good an Election; Upon what Point of the Circle shall this Man enter? Where shall he begin the infamous Trade of Iniquity? How many Chances does he run, that the Proposers shall not be of his Interest; and, not being of his Interest, that he shall not be nam'd as a Candidate? But suppose he should be so far happy, as to have one or more of the Proposers on his Side; yet how great is the Hazard, that the Electors shall reject him as a Candidate? Or, allowing that they sustain him a Candidate; nay, even supposing that he hath influenc'd, and brib'd over, a Majority of the Electors to his Interest; yet what Security, nay even what Probability, can he have of Success? How shall he discover those, who may desert him in the main Point at balloting for a Member, yet take his Money, and openly profess their Attachments? or by what human Means can he unveil the Secrecy of the Ballot? how come at the Knowledge of the People's Suffrages? Let us suppose they have promis'd him; nay, put the Case as strong as 'tis possible, let us suppose they have sworn to him: Not to mention the Hazard of a Discovery by swearing so many Persons; the Promise and  
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the Oath, tending in themselves to subvert the Virtue and inflave the Liberty of Mankind, are equally unlawful, equally immoral and wicked: and, being thus originally wicked and immoral, the Obligation becomes void from the Beginning, and the Party contracting only truly culpable by performing the Conditions of such a faithless Contract. The natural Attachments to Virtue would, under these Circumstances, certainly induce many to disappoint the Views of the Corruptor. They could, then, not only serve their own fancy'd Self-interest; but make a Merit, at the same Time, of serving their Country, and electing the Man, whom, in their Hearts, they esteem'd most worthy to represent them. I say, this would be the Case with many, and even with the worst of the People: For tho' politic Writers have had, some of them, the Face to recommend Bribery and Corruption, as a Sort of Virtue in Government; few or none of the most Corrupted, but have own'd it as a Fault; they endeavour, indeed, to excuse themselves; they alledge the Necessity of the Times; that if they won't, another will; and, since that is the Case, why not they receive the present Advantage,

vantage, as well as another? Now, give these  
 Persons the Ballot; these very Persons, tho'  
 they took the Bribe, would exert their Liber-  
 ty, because it might be done without Discove-  
 ry, because they could serve themselves and  
 Country too: But if we consider the unhappy  
 Circumstances of such, who are at present sub-  
 jected to the Influence of the Great, not so  
 much from a Depravity of Manners, as from  
 Affection to their Kindred and Families; who  
 depend upon their Superiors by many Circum-  
 stances in their Leases; who are in Rent Ar-  
 rears, or in Expectation of renewing an expir'd  
 Lease; and who, to keep themselves and their  
 Children from Ruin, can not, nor dare not,  
 disoblige their Masters: How many, I say, of  
 this Sort would be glad to break their Fetters?  
 how many, whose Voice is now but the Echo  
 of another's Will, would joyfully pass a free  
 Sentiment in Secret? Was this the Case, what  
 Man could attempt, with the least View of  
 Success, to bribe even the most profligate Cha-  
 racters; and, if not these, far less others of  
 the least Degree of Virtue? Must not Elections,  
 in such Case, be fair and honest? Must not  
 the Electors be free and independent? and,  
 being



being independent, will they not, of Course, consult their own Interest; and will not that Interest produce, in the Event, the Interest of the Country? We cannot suppose but that, by Means of this Liberty and Freedom of Choice, the Virtue, the Integrity and Merit, of individual Persons, would recommend them, above all other Considerations, to the Esteem and Approbation of their Fellow Countrymen and Electors. This must of Course make Parliaments naturally more uncorruptible, than what at present they presumptively are; and reduce Ministers to the happy Necessity of advancing the Interest of the Crown, by the Unanimity, Affection, and Love, of the People.

A Candidate for serving in Parliament must, by the second Order, possess a valuable Estate of his own; be independent on the Crown; and no late Member of the preceding Parliament. The first of these is intirely conformable to the Laws of the Land, which at present are in Force; wherefore we shall confine our Observations to the two last. The Influence of Posts and Pensions upon Members of Parliament began not in this Age: It was felt, and felt severely, when Ministers had much less  
Power



Power to spread its malignant Effects, than they have had for many Years past; it was felt before the Revolution, and bitterly complain'd of after it. This venomous Monster while but yet in its Cradle, under the Care of its nursing Father King *Charles*, alarm'd and terrify'd the Nation; yet has been nourish'd, and caress'd, and brought to Maturity, under its Step-dame, a Revolution Ministry. The Sons of Freedom, or those who at least would be accounted such, have defended its Plea of Alliance and Connection with Liberty; a Thing as unnatural, as that the Servant should be the Lord, or the Hireling the Master: for whoever holds any thing at the Will of another, must study not to offend but to please the Person of whom he holds, be he a Prince or a Minister; and be the Thing held a Post, a Pension, or any moveable and moving Consideration. Whoever is in Possession, or Expectation, if he intends to remain where he is, or to advance a Step higher, is bound to his good Behaviour, to please and obey, as he values what he enjoys, or what he hopes for. It is often ask'd; But why may not a good Man serve his King, and serve his Country too?

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Why

Why may he not have a Post under his Prince, and at the same Time support in Parliament the Interests of his Country? But the more natural Question is, Why rather may not such a Man by serving his Country, and consequently his King, disoblige the Minister? And why may not the Minister, for such presumptuous Service, turn him out of his Post, and strike off his Pension? If a Place-Man is an honest Man, 'tis ten to one but at some Time or other he will lose his Post by opposing the Minister; but if a false Man, it is as much odds that he will stop at nothing to serve himself and ruin the Country. We have seen good and honest Men in Place and out of Place; we have seen such of them, as were in Place, discarded by Ministers as much below them in Ability as in Dignity; discarded, because they would not serve the dirty Jobs of a Man they despis'd. These Men while in Place, and when out of Place, were great and uniform. We applaud the Memory of the Dead, we honour and admire the Merit of the Living; But how many such Men have we at all? Or how many among the Commons? But, to pass all this, what good Reason can be assign'd, why  
 Posts



Posts and Pensions ought to be given to Members of Parliament. To every Post there is certainly, or should be, some Duty annex'd. If then a Member performs well his Duty in Parliament, which is very extensive, and requires, if honestly perform'd, all the Application any one Man can give; he must neglect the Duty of his Post: Or, if he observes or performs the Duty of his Post, he must betray the Trust of his Constituents, by neglecting his Duty in Parliament. If 'tis a Pension the Member enjoys, it must, or ought to be, for some Services perform'd; and, if for parliamentary Service, there is all the Presumption imaginable that it was directed by the Pension of the Minister, not by the Conscience or Honour of the Member. No Parliament-man can complain for want of a Pension, or be justify'd for accepting it; for the People, who support the Crown itself, are able and willing also to support their Members. Again, How comes it about, that, in a free Country, there should be a monopolizing of Politics? Why should a few Gentlemen sit, like hereditary Voters, in the House of Commons, one Parliament after another, and ingross to themselves the principal

Honours, Places, and Posts of the Country ; while Men of equal, or more extensive Abilities, remain unemploy'd ? Let Princes and Ministers resume or bestow, at Pleasure, the Posts, Pensions, and Places in their Gift ; but let not the Trustees and Representatives of the People, be the Dependents of a Court : Let not private Interest and Advancement interfere with public Duty : Let no Temptation be put in the Way to bias the Heart : For have we not seen Men, who in Appearance were beyond the Influence of Avarice and Ambition ; who were honoured, and respected, and admired by the Nation, as the Guardians and Bulwarks of Liberty ; yet with Infamy and Disgrace, in the Twinkling of an Eye, drop into the Court, like Stars from Heaven ? Nay, so many Instances of this Kind have been and are, that a new Proverb was lately invented, and meets still with much Approbation, *Every Man hath his Price*. Whatever tends to introduce Partiality among the People, or to split and divide the Interest of the Community into the Interest of private Parties and Cabals, is destructive to the Liberty and Independency of every free State ; but to continue a few of the People  
from



from Parliament to Parliament, without Interruption or Change, is to substitute the Interest of these Representatives in Room of the national Interest; and to allow of Posts and Places to Members of Parliament, is to bind them principally to the Interest of the Minister: But to subject every private Interest to the common Interest of all, and to extinguish every private Faction and Party by enlarging the Means of Access to Parliament, upon the popular Foundation of free Election and regulated Change, is to promote and advance Liberty and Virtue: For, by excluding Members of Parliament from Posts and Pensions, all ministerial Influence and Court Corruption is abolish'd; and by bringing in new Members, and giving Recess to the old at the Formation of new Parliaments, and at the annual Sessions of the same Parliament, every partial Interest, which may be presumed to take Place when one Sett of Men are perpetually continued, is cut off. But this leads us to the third Order,

Which describes the constant and uniform Access and Recess of the People to Parliament, and augments the Number of Parliament-men. There can no such Thing be in Nature as a  
publick

publick Interest, unless the People, who make up that Publick, can be comprehended under such a Form, as to exclude the Predominancy of the partial Interest of individual Parts. Now this Exclusion can never be obtained, but by a frequent and periodical Change of the popular Representation; which Representation ought to consist of such a Number of Members, as may give the fairest Opportunity to all, who are indued with Property, Parts, and Abilities, to serve and represent, at sometime or other, their Country in Parliament: But the Order now before us sets to View the proper Periods and due Frequency of these Changes, and the just Number of Members requisite to ascertain and for ever preserve the truly national Representation; so that, was this Order to take Effect, the Interest of the Publick would be exalted above all Competition with, and Danger from, private Interests. There was a Time, when Gentlemen were not over-fond of being elected Members of Parliament; but at that Time no other Advantage arose, from obtaining this publick Character, than what was national and common: For the Treasure and Posts of the Crown were not great and nume-

rous



rous enough, to make any considerable Influence. The Interest Gentlemen then made, if Gentlemen then made any Interest, was to be excus'd from parliamentary Service; for the general Allegation then was, that this Service took them off from their own private Affairs; and, in consequence of this natural and rational Way of Thinking, they often chang'd Hands, and relieved one another of the Burthen. Let us then break the slavish and barbarous Intail of parliamentary Honours, created and supported by the Corruption and Villany of modern Times: But, to effect this, the Order now before us sets forth, that there shall be a perpetual Access and Recess to and from Parliament, in such Manner, that tho' each Member shall remain three Years in Parliament, yet one third Part of the Members shall annually recede, and give Place to a new third Part annually coming in. By this Means, the popular Representation undergoes a regular and constant Change, and by this Change of Members, so perpetual and uniform, every Gentleman, who is qualify'd, hath a Chance, at sometime or other, of being admitted; and the Parliament itself, according to all human Probability, can never be brought  
under

under Influence : For, not to mention the Security which the Ballot brings, whereby every Gentleman may without Discovery vote as he pleases ; let us only observe, that to corrupt a new Parliament requires Time ; but let the Industry of the Ministry be as much as it can be, it cannot take much Effect here, because those who reasonably may be most suspected, to wit, such as have served longest in Parliament, and with whom consequently the Minister must be best acquainted ; those I say, having served three Years, must retire from the House, and for a like Term of Years remain incapable of being re-elected ; whilst, in the mean Time, their Place is supplied by a new Sett, unacquainted at Court, and uninfluenced, and for a long Time, we may presume, uninfluenceable by the Minister. For the Genius and natural Virtue and Interest of the Nation must, in these Circumstances, be in constant Action, and perpetually exert itself in our national Assemblies. But there is another Reason for thus changing and renewing the Parliament, and for augmenting the Number of its Members, and that is, the Insufficiency of annual, of triennial, and much more of septennial Parliaments. As to the annual



nual Parliament; on Presumption that for most Part, or at any Time, it may be compos'd of intirely new Members, in that Case, it is justly liable to the Objection of Inexperience and Want of Knowledge in the Method and Forms of the House; and thence may fall into Errors of very considerable Importance. As to the triennial and septennial Parliament; we have had, in latter Times, Experience of both, but most unhappily preferr'd the worst. Both indeed are capable, tho' not equally liable, to be influenced and corrupted. They are liable to be corrupted, because the Members of these Parliaments are few, enter upon their Office all at the same Time, and continue in it for the same Term of Years. The Length of Time they continue in Office, gives the Court Leisure to seduce; the equal Time they remain in it, gives the Minister Opportunity of becoming equally acquainted with each; and the Paucity of Members renders it practicable and easy for him, by a proper Distribution of Posts and Pensions, to secure a large Majority of the House. But the Parliament propos'd, by the Order before us, admits of all the Independency that an annual Parliament can pretend to, and all the

Experience and Wisdom claimed by the triennial, without being exposed, or incident, to the Inconveniencies of either. By the yearly Supply of Members, this Parliament is in some sort annual ; yet triennial, by the Length of Time wherein each Member serves. The Increase of Members, as proposed in the Order, is made chiefly on the Side of the Counties. Many and just Complaints have, for a long Time past, been made concerning the Decay of Boroughs, and the Privilege permitted them by Law of sending up Representatives to Parliament, double in Number to what many of the Counties send ; but to remedy this by any other Method, than what is here proposed, would, we imagine, be attended with Inconveniencies ; for 'tis in general difficult to abrogate Privileges, but most difficult of all to abrogate such as rest their Foundations in long and immemorial Practice : Wherefore 'tis provided, that Counties, and Cities, and Boroughs, shall all be upon a like Footing, and each send up three Representatives, allowing the City of *London* its due Præ-eminence of nominating twelve. The Members of Parliament, according to this Plan, would amount to nine Hundred and fifty-four Persons ; a  
 Number



Number more justly proportioned to represent the Inhabitants of this Island, than the Number admitted at present into Parliament.\*

The fourth Order tends to establish perpetually the periodical Term for electing Members of Parliament; and the fifth describes the annual Expences. As to the first of these Orders, we have a sufficient Number of Instances, in former Reigns, of the Tyranny and Misery, which that Part of Prerogative (here condemn'd) inflicted upon the Nation: And, as to the Kings themselves, *Charles* the first suffered by it; *Charles* the second was hated for it; and *James* the second, by exercising it, lost his Sovereignty. Now whatever has been done of this sort, may be done again, by Princes alike ill disposed, or under the Influence of similar ill Council: I say, future Times, if this Prerogative continues, may produce to us new *Charles's* and *James's*; and the more so, as the Power of the Crown exceeds now, beyond Measure, the Power it had then. But was there even no Hazard of this, 'tis, in its own Nature, ridiculous, that a Prince, whose Power is derived from and inherent in the People, should exert a Faculty, which, supposing him a

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good

\* See the Note in Page 51.

good King, can be of no real Advantage to him ; and, supposing him a bad one, must be of the last Detriment and Hurt to the People. For, what Purpose can it serve, but the Purpose of a wicked Heart, to dispense with Parliaments in a free Country ? or, which is the same thing in other Words, to make the Election of Parliament-men depend upon the Pleasure of the Prince ? Our present Sovereign, I'm sure, has neither the Will, nor the Temptation, to abuse this Crown-Quality ; but no body can answer for the contingent Disposition of future Princes. 'Tis a Prerogative which can serve no good End, but has serv'd, and may again serve, many an ill one ; and therefore is of no real Ornament to the Crown, but of dangerous and hazardful Consequence to the People. Concerning the last of these Orders, it is but just and honourable, that the People should defray the necessary Expences of their Members serving in Parliament ; nor can any Man be esteem'd the more generous and good for refusing to accept of what his Constituents appoint him ; since, generally speaking, 'tis only a Sign of his Intention to follow some other Interest, which may conduce more to his own private Advantage : Besides,



sides; no Man of Fortune and Generosity will refuse to accept of this Benevolence of the People; when he considers, that his Refusal will make others refuse, whose Circumstances cannot so well bear them out. The Extent of the parliamentary Expence, incurr'd by this Order, amounts to three Hundred sixty-one Thousand eight Hundred Pounds *per Annum*; a small and inconsiderable Expence indeed, considering the Strength and Security it would add to Liberty and national Unanimity.\*



### C H A P. III.

**T**HE last Thing under Consideration is Arms, which, as directed by good or bad Orders, bring great Security, or great Danger, to a State. Arms are either domestick or foreign. Arms are said to be domestick, when the People, to whom a Country belongs, possess and uses them; but are said to be foreign, when put into the Hands of Mercenaries or Auxiliaries.

\* See the Note in Page 51.

Auxiliaries. Mercenaries are such as fight purely for Hire; and are commonly commanded by such Generals and Officers, as the State, which takes them into Pay, pleases to appoint. Auxiliaries are the Forces, which one State begs and borrows of another, when in Distress. But the constant Misfortunes and Ruin attending such States, as have trusted to Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, put it beyond Question, that they are, of all other Forces, the most dangerous and fatal. Wherefore we will confine ourselves, at present, to the Consideration of domestick Arms. Domestick Arms are either natural or unnatural: Natural, when the native Force of a Country is under such Management and Direction, as to correspond with the natural Scituation of the People in it. If the Property of a Country is so placed, and the Orders of Government so contriv'd, as that the People must be Slaves, then the Arms of that Country must naturally be plac'd in the Hands of the Prince; that is, the Soldiery must obey his Orders, fight his Battles, and be maintained by the Patrimony of the Crown: But if the Property of a Country, and the Orders of Government, are so placed and contrived, as that either the Nobility is  
powerful,



powerful, or the People free, then the Arms of that Country will naturally be lodged in the Hands of the People, but with this Difference, that, where the Nobility is powerful, the People, as Vassals and Dependents, will support the Interests of their Lords; but where the People are free, they will defend and maintain their own Interest only, which, in that Case, is the common Interest of the Country. Domestick Arms are said to be unnatural, when the native Force of a Country is under such Management and Direction, as is inconsistent with, and tends to alter, the natural Scituation of the People in it. Thus it would be, should a King, who had the Property of a Country, permit the Nobility, or the People, to raise, officer, and maintain the arm'd Force of the State; or should a Nobility, or a People, who possess'd the Country as Proprietors, allow the King to levy, discipline, and command the Forces. For no People, having the Sword in their Hands, will ever submit to be Slaves; and no Prince, who can execute his Commands by a powerful Military, will ever regard, or confine himself to, any other Law, than the Law of his own Will and Pleasure. We have already described how the

Arms

Arms of our Country were disposed, while the Country itself remained under the Dominion of the Nobility. We have already noticed, how, when the Ballance of Property was at last vested in the People, the Arms and Strength of the People became præ-eminent; and how, when they attempted their own Defence against *Charles*, they naturally enough accomplished it. But the same Effect followed, which in all Probability would have followed, had the King himself been victorious; for *Cromwell*, who was at that Time the Hero of the Commons, by being trusted too far, and permitted to model and martial the Forces to his own Purpose, created and maintained, for the first Time, a Standing Army in *Britain*. But this Method of holding Arms, being as unnatural as it was new, was opposed by the natural Scituation of the People, and in the Event overthrown: For, however easily that Army might have changed the Scituation of Property, and modify'd it at Pleasure, either to an arbitrary or a free Government; yet as they did not do this, but only held the Government in Contradiction to its Biass, they sunk in Course of Time before its Influence. Afterwards, *Charles* the second and  
*James*



*James* his Brother, however much they hated *Cromwell*, evidenc'd successively, in both their Reigns, the highest Regard for his Method of Government; and wanted, also, to be supported in their Throne by the Help of a Standing Army. But *James*, by pushing this too far, gave Spirit to Resistance, and was unking'd: For the Revolution and the Settlement were conducted and introduced upon the Principles of Liberty and Resistance, and by these Principles only can with Honour and Dignity be defended or supported. But neither Liberty nor Resistance can be secured to a People, who are over-aw'd and bound down by a military Force; a Military, whose Honour and Advancement depends upon the Prince. The Cause and Occasion of the Banishment of the *Stuart* Family never can, agreeably to common Sense or common Liberty, be approved or justified in any Prince whatever, but especially in such whose Claim to reign is derived and founded upon the People's Right to Freedom, to Arms, and, the proper Use of them, Defence and Resistance. Wherefore, as the Situation and Circumstances of our Country require, that the Arms of the Nation be not in a hired, mer-

cenary, standing Army, but in the People; let the following Order take Place.

*That the national Militia be composed of such as are Freeholders in the Country, of whom every Person worth 100 l. a Year, and upwards, shall be ranked in the Cavalry; and every Person having under 100 l. a Year, shall be ranked in the Foot. That the Horse and Foot, in every Parish, be mustered and exercised on some certain Day in every Month. That the Horse by themselves, and the Foot by themselves, meet in their respective Parishes, each of them once a Year, and elect by Ballot their several Officers for the Year ensuing; and when the Officers are thus elected, then shall all the Horse and Foot, in the several Parishes of every County, assemble, upon a certain Day thereafter, at the most central Place in the said County, and pass in general Review before the Lord Lieutenant of the County, or such Person, residing within the County, as his Majesty shall appoint to command them in chief. And, for the better Security of the Nation from Invasion and Rebellion, Light-Houses shall be erected at proper Distances towards London, which Light-Houses shall be*  
fired



*fired at the Approach of the Enemy, or at the Rising of a Rebellion; beginning at that Light-House which shall first discover the Enemy, and proceeding onwards in the nearest Direction to London; upon firing of which Light-Houses the several Parish Bells shall be set a Ringing, till the Militia of the Parish assemble; and, being assembled, they shall march to the general Rendezvous of the County Militia; where, being mustered, they shall observe the Orders and Commands of the Lord Lieutenant, or other Officer, appointed by the King to command in chief. And, for the better Provision and Regulation of the national Forces in case of War, be it enacted, that when the Parliament shall determine the Levies to be proportionably rais'd out of every County, the same shall be made by mustering the Youth of the national Militia, that is, such as are from eighteen Years of Age to thirty, at the general Rendezvous of the County; where, being assembled, they shall draw Lots for the Number to be sent abroad, as for one fourth, one fifth of the whole, or whatever the parliamentary Proportion may be; and, the said Lots being drawn, they, upon whom they fall, shall chuse for themselves, by Ballot, their own Officers, ex-*

*cepting the general Officers and Commander in chief, whom the King shall nominate at Pleasure: And such Army, so to be muster'd, having serv'd one Year in the War, shall return home, and be relieved by such a new Levy, as the Parliament shall think proper; but which shall be raised after the same Manner, as the former was.*

The Arguments against disciplining the Militia may be reduced to two Sorts; one respecting the King, the other the People. Concerning the first, it may and has often been alledged, that to give Arms to the People, is to put it in the Power of those, who are disaffected to his Majesty, to rise in Rebellion. Now, allowing this Objection to be true, but allowing it merely for the Sake of Argument, let us also at the same time consider what the Dangers are, the natural and consequent Dangers, arising from a Standing Army, to a free but a defenceless and unarm'd People? What may not an ill disposed Prince do, if ever such shall be upon the Throne, with such an Army, over such a People? Or what Security, in that Case, shall the People have for their Liberties? If no Tyranny was ever erected, or, being erected, was ever maintained and supported, but by an Army; and



and if no Nation ever had a Standing Army long, which was not at some Time or other subdued and enslaved by it, what may not such a People, as we are, apprehend and fear from such an Army, as we have, under some future Prince? Now, supposing the Danger and Hazard to his Majesty as high, as 'tis possible to be, from dismissing his Army, it never can bear the smallest Degree of Comparison to the great and important Hazard of the People from the Want of a disciplin'd Militia. No Man, reverencing Liberty, can assert it: No Prince, having the Soul of a Hero, can think it. But, to answer the Objection more directly. The King runs by no Comparison such Hazard of Rebellion from his Militia, as he does by keeping on Foot a Standing Army; for, by trusting to the latter, he may venture to injure and oppress; Injury naturally begets Dislike, and Dislike, in a People, turns out, at some time or other, into Disobedience and Rebellion: But, by confiding in the national Militia, he must remain without Temptation to injure; and, of consequence, the People continue without Inclination to revolt: For no People were ever known to rebel, who had not first labour'd  
under

under Grievances, and been injur'd. But to suppose a Rebellion in a national Militia, composed of the Freeholders and Landlords of the Country, we must suppose it to be either general, or of a Part; if general, then the Nation must be dissatisfy'd and injur'd: They must want either to redress some iniquitous Administration, or, being finally exasperated, to effect another Exclusion. Such a Rebellion would be laudable and worthy: It would be esteem'd and honour'd by every one, who really and unaffectedly adher'd to the resisting Principles of Liberty and the Revolution. But then such a Rebellion never can be an Object of Concern to his present Majesty, nor ever ought to be fear'd by any of his Family, or of his Ministers; for the Cause of Liberty and the Cause of the People, is one and the same with the Interest of the Revolution Settlement, when that Interest is honestly considered, and rightly pursued; whence no such Oppression can naturally ensue, as to alarm the Jealousy of the People, or deserve their Resentment. But, if the Rebellion should be of a Part, if it should proceed from the misled or factious Attachments of a few in Favour of the Relicts of outed Royalty; then the national  
Militia



Militia would stand by the Throne, and not only infallibly, but suddenly, quench the Rebellion : For no military Soldiers of Fortune can be put in Competition with a national Militia, either as to Force, for they are incomparably more numerous ; or as to Courage and Fidelity, for they have Country, Property, publick Feeling, and Family Affection, in short, every national and private Consideration, that can excite or impel Men, animate and inflame a human Heart, to extreme Resolution and Bravery.—The second Objection to a national Militia arises from the People themselves ; for, 'tis alledg'd, that the People would not submit to the Fatigues of Discipline, would not submit to bear Arms ; but would, as they do now, hire others to officiate for them : And, indeed, nothing is more certain, than that a People may in Time be effeminated and corrupted. Luxury, Indolence, and Excess, may deface every manly Quality, extinguish every heroic Virtue, originally belonging to a Nation ; but this must be the very worst Circumstances any People can be in. : For, if they are free, they remain on the very Brink of Slavery, and stand the unresisting Prey of the first Destroyer ; but, if  
 Slaves

Slaves, are Slaves for Life, beyond all Possibility of Recovery. Was it true then, that the People of this Country were indifferent and unwilling to carry Arms for their own Preservation, they must be sunk into the deepest Extremity of Pusillanimity and Weakness; they must be worse now, than ever they were in the worst of Times; worse in a State of Freedom, of Liberty, and Revolution-Independence, than when rid by the heavy and oppressive Weight of the *Stuarts*. No Man, who approves of and wishes well to the Revolution, can assert this much, and not also acknowledge, that every possible Means ought to be us'd, every possible Encouragement given, to awake the People to a Sense of Virtue and Manhood. This Assertion of Unwillingness in the People to bear Arms would, was it true, be the strongest Argument possible for raising the Militia, disciplining the Militia, and reviving and invigorating the dying Spirit of Liberty among the People. If it could be said a few Years ago, when we were at our Ease, and in the Height of a calm Tranquility, that the Militia, the Freeholders, the People of *Britain*, were averse to Arms and warlike Discipline, what must they



they be, what can they be, at the Approach of a Storm? Can a Man, who is afraid of a smooth Sea and fair Weather, throw himself headlong into the Midst of a Tempest, and brave in an Instant all the Chances of Perdition? Could those Men, who are now presumed averse to the simple Exercise and Discipline of War, have Courage or Resolution to risque the Dangers of the Field, and to undergo the Fatigues of Encampment, against a veteran Military, invading, at the Desire of the Prince, their Liberty and Right? But let us see what Foundation there is for this bold and detracting Asseveration, *that the People are unwilling to arm.* When *James* the second would have had his People and Parliament consent to set aside the Study of that unnecessary Science, *the Knowledge of Arms*, and trust to an Augmentation of the *standing mercenary Army*, they refus'd it; that very Parliament refus'd it, which had granted him every thing, unless this very Article; but here they stopt, and here he lost himself: Nor did the People, at any Time thereafter, desire the Arms to be taken from them, as a military Load; but in the Height of Credulity and Trust, under various Disguises and Pre-

tences from the Crown, permitted a *Standing Army* to become familiar to their Eyes in fighting a foreign War: But the Soldiers never trampled the peaceable Possession of the Subject, but the Subject repin'd and complain'd of his Company. Now, in all this, is no Appearance of Dislike to Arms: And if at present, as Matters stand, they employ a second Hand, is it much to be wonder'd at, when so little Account is made of their Service, when every Art and Device is practis'd to make their Musters ridiculous? Is it to be wonder'd they should decline playing the Fool; decline, like Children with Rattles in their Hands, to make a Noise and Show to no Manner of Purpose? Where is there Care taken to *discipline* them? Where is there any *Trust and Reliance* plac'd in them? Are not *standing Forces* kept on Foot? Are not the People at the Expence, and a vast Expence, to maintain and keep up these Forces? But give the Prospect that these Forces shall be *disbanded*; that the Charge, for keeping up such an Army, shall be saved in the Pockets of the People; and that the Crown will give half the Encouragement and Countenance to the *Militia*, which it hath given for these fifty  
Years



Years past to the *mercenary Troops* of its own Creation: Then see, whither they will decline to make their Musters, and learn their Discipline in Person; but, till these Things can be fairly hop'd and expected, it is not to be suppos'd, that People will leave Business, and in Person attend silly Sport. One Thing more we shall say in Favour of a *national Militia*, that it not only has been the constant and perpetual Defence and Support of this Kingdom, till *Usurpation and Tyranny* made Way for *mercenary Bands*; but in all Ages, wherever it was used in free States, never was conquer'd, never equall'd, by the mightiest Armies of Slaves and Mercenaries, but itself hath had the Glory and Renown of overcoming and trampling down the most numerous and most powerful Armies the World ever saw.—Finally, from the Nature and Tendency of these Orders to confirm and perpetuate our national Scituation and Circumstances, we may conclude, in Terms of our third and last Proposition, *That the only natural and lasting Expedient, whereby Party and Faction may be ruin'd for ever, and whereby Liberty may be inviolably fix'd, and the Throne establish'd safe and secure to our Princes, with*

*the national Applause and the universal Concurrency of the People, is, and only can be, by adjusting the Government to the national Ballance and Constitution, describ'd and set to View in the preceding Orders, whence every Interest will be taken in, and every malignant and selfish Humour depriv'd of Power to hurt,*







## CONCLUSION.

TO make a few Reflections, naturally arising from all that hath been said. Our present Sovereign hath had the like good Fortune in suppressing this Rebellion, as his Father had in suppressing a former : But if this new Advantage be no better improv'd than the last was ; if there is still an Endeavour to divide and abuse the People ; and to represent *the Opposition*, and the Sentiments of the Nation, as the Effects of *Rebellion* and *Jacobitism* ; our internal Disorders must continue to increase, till, by Means of our very Distempers, our final Cure, or our final Destruction, be accomplish'd. Interested and selfish Persons may join in opposing the Court, upon national Principles. They may labour and fatigue themselves, in the Cause of Liberty and Patriotism, in order to be taken Notice of, and soon preferr'd. Nay, *Jacobites*, sincere, downright, bigotted *Jacobites*, may heartily and vigorously join Issue in the  
Opposition,

Opposition, and support the common Cause of *Freedom and Independency*. All this may be true, and supposing it is true, can never make *Independency* itself ridiculous, or the Promoters of *Independency* the Promoters of Rebellion; no more than the whimsical Principles, or the wicked Lives, of particular Christians, can make Christianity itself contemptible and odious. Because *Cappoch* was convicted and hang'd for Rebellion, shall we therefore conclude that the *Clergy of England* were Rebels? Because the *Minister*, in 1740, spread and promoted Corruption, weakned and undermin'd national Virtue and national *Independency*, ought we to conclude, that all who engag'd in his Majesty's Service, during the Superintendency of that Minister, had the like evil Dispositions with himself? Yet these, and a thousand other Absurdities, shall be true, if 'tis fair and honest to discountenance and lay aside Thoughts of *Independency and Freedom*, because *Jacobites* themselves may be engag'd in the Cause. But so far is this from scandalizing *Independency*, to wit, that *Jacobites*, and all Persons whatever, except those who are hir'd to oppose it, may join in supporting it; that this very Thing is the



the strongest Demonstration possible, that the Undertaking is national and disinterested ; for no other Principle, than what is publick and national, can comprehend the common Interest of all Sects, and Parties, and Opinions, among a People.

But now, that we have mentioned *Jacobitism*, let us consider it somewhat more particularly ; for, I am not a little perswaded, but that 'tis possible the Principles of *Jacobitism* may be introduc'd into a *Revolution-Court*, or any other Court on Earth, as well as it was introduc'd into the Court of *James* the second. If I am not very greatly mistaken, *James* ascended the Throne owning and professing himself publickly to be a Papist ; nor can any one fairly contradict me, if I say, that his private Religion would have been no Impediment to his publick Administration and Government, had he retained the Bowels of a Man, and permitted to others the same Liberty he took to himself ; had he maintained and promoted the civil and religious Liberty and Rights of his People, and squar'd his Government to the natural Genius and Temper of the Constitution : But Bigotry on one Hand, and Ambition on the

the other, prompted and impell'd him to invade and injure both; these, I say, prompted; but the unequal and excessive *Prerogative* and *Power* of the Crown gave him the Opportunity and Means, by *Corruption* and *Arms*, of putting his Designs in Execution. Now, those who defended and promoted this unjustifiable *Influence* and *Power* of the Crown were afterwards denominated, like all other Sects and Parties in the World, after the Name of their most distinguish'd Patron and Leader, and call'd *Jacobites*. But in any Nation, and under any Reign, whoever endeavours to aggrandize and extend the *Influence* and *Power* of the Crown beyond the natural *Rights* and *Liberties* of the People, the natural Frame and Temperament of the Constitution; whoever endeavours to raise *implicit Loyalty, Confidence, and Trust* in a Nation to a Prince, at the Expence and to the extinguishing of *Independency, popular Orders, and national Security*; be the Name of the Prince what it will; be it *Thomas* or *Peter*, or *George*, or *James*; the Principles are the same as the former, and the Epithet of *Jacobitism* equally applicable to both. I don't know how, but it seems somewhat to  
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fare with Politicks, as it has often done with Religion. A Saint may innocently commit those Crimes, for which a Sinner can find no Forgiveness; a Saint may cheat, and lie, and cozen, and assassinate, but do all with Impunity, providing it may serve the Cause of God and Church; whilst a Sinner, who does these Things, is reprobated beyond Redemption. For Heaven's Sake, can what was wicked and ill in the *Stuart's* Family, be good and worthy in *Revolution-Princes*? Can we justly condemn the Violence of those Princes, and with any Face of Modesty approve and applaud in these the very Means and Power whereby that Violence was accomplish'd? Were *Bribery, Corruption, and Standing Armies*, justly suspected and zealously oppos'd by our Forefathers; and shall we their Children quietly bear with them; nay patiently view all these Causes of Oppression and Misrule multiplied without Measure, and extended without Limitation? Is it possible, that a *Revolution-Government* should demand it; a Government founded on the Ruins of Tyranny, and created to support *Liberty* and *Independency*? Or shall a *Revolution-People*

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grant it ; a People descended from those, who hazarded every thing to save themselves from such a Rod ?

*Rebellion, Popery, and Jacobitism*, may be imputed to *the Opposition* now, as it hath been in Times before ; and the People, as they have been, so may they again be for sometime deluded : But, while we remain without *fundamental Orders of Security*, there will always be too much Room for *Opposition* ; and the temporary Delusion of the People can only serve to make them awake with a keener Resentment, in case it shall be left in their Power to resent. There will always be Room for *Opposition*, while the national Property remains *unsecur'd*, the Manners of the People neglected or *debauch'd*, and the Arms of the Country in the Hands of *Mercenaries*.

The Design of this Essay was to set these Things in a fair and candid Light ; to establish and perpetuate the Principles of the *Revolution* ; to point out the fatal Consequences of *ministerial Opposition* and *popular Credulity* ; to fix the Point wherein *all Parties* may unite ; wherein the Safety and Glory of the *Prince*,  
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the Happiness and Liberty of the *People*, may alike coalite and center: Or, if there must still be an *Opposition*, to shew wherein that *Opposition* should consist; that it is not to oppose *Men*, but *Things*; to trust not to *one Sett* of Ministers, rather than to another, but to trust to *such Orders*, as may be able to make even *bad Ministers* good.

*F I N I S.*



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